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1. Introduction 
 
Bertrand Russell is well-known for having raised serious objections against some of the most 
influential among his contemporary philosophical figures and movements. Russell’s critical 
outlook would in some ways set the tone for what half a decade later was described as the 
analytic ‘revolution in philosophy’ (Ayer et al. 1967). This ‘revolution’ has often been 
conceived in terms of the ‘overcoming’ or ‘elimination’ of rival approaches, in a manner 
which, as we shall see, is traceable back to Russell’s critique of his contemporaries. 
The typical (though controversial) story that is often retold about the analytic ‘revolution’ 
pinpoints its beginnings in Russell and Moore’s rebellion against British Idealism (see e.g. 
Russell 1993, 42). Russell (1928a, 57, 68-69) himself would position his (and Moore’s) 
rejection of idealism among a variety of anti-idealist projects developed in the first decade of 
the twentieth century, divided into two mutually non-exclusive camps. The one camp’s 
rejections of idealism come from a technical standpoint; among these, Russell (1928a) 
includes himself and Moore alongside James, Frege, Meinong, and Husserl (68-69). The 
other camp involves part of the approach developed by the pragmatists (who fall into both 
camps) and Bergson.
1
 Their overcoming of Idealism is not primarily motivated by technical 
developments, but rather, as Russell notes, by a dislike for ‘the regimentation and orderliness 
involved in a world created by logic’ (1928a, 57). Russell would further differentiate the two 
camps by noting that the former camp is motivated primarily by academic concerns (showing 
Idealism to be false), while the latter’s projects would appeal to a broader public (57). In 
Russell’s account, in the early twentieth century, the popularity contest had been won by 
Bergson who ‘outbid [pragmatism] in appealing to the same tastes’ (60).2 
In 1912, having already left behind, as a task thought to be well accomplished, the attempt 
to refute idealism, Russell would turn to a new target. His criticism of Bergson’s philosophy 
is among the most vehement Russell had directed against his contemporaries. This chapter 
will examine Russell’s reading of Bergson, outlining the various critical arguments Russell 
deployed against him throughout his work, while also highlighting some contemporary 
defences of Bergson and Russell’s responses to them. Section 2 sets off by looking at 
                                                             
1
 Though Russell (1928a) does not explicitly place his friend and collaborator Whitehead in 
this camp, he does mention Whitehead’s ‘defence of a more or less Bergsonian metaphysic’ 
(55) as an example of the blurring of the lines involved in his taxonomy. Russell also 
acknowledges Bergson’s influence on Whitehead elsewhere, e.g. Russell 1988, 313-315, 320; 
1956, 101. See also Cassou-Noguès 2005. 
2
 Prior to Russell, Stebbing (1914) had argued that pragmatism and Bergson appear to both be 
responding to ‘the protest that philosophy has been made too hard for the plain man’ (7). 
Nonetheless, unlike Russell, Stebbing argues in detail against the identification of Bergson’s 
philosophy with pragmatism, two currents which she shows to be in significant opposition.  
 2 
 
Russell’s meeting with Bergson and the series of events leading up to his first published 
critique of Bergson’s philosophy. Section 3 will analyse Russell’s review of Bergson’s 
Laughter, while also examining a contemporary criticism of the review by Paul Weiss, who 
argued that it contradicts Russell’s theory of types. Section 4 offers an exposition of Russell’s 
objections to Bergson’s views, as developed in ‘The Philosophy of Bergson’. The reader 
should be warned that in section 4 I abstain from discussing contemporary criticisms of 
Russell’s controversial interpretations of, and arguments against, Bergson; this task is 
deferred to sections 5 and 6.
3
 Though Bergson himself refused to enter into debate with 
Russell, there were replies to Russell by H. Wildon Carr (officially sanctioned by Bergson 
and responded to by Russell) and by Karin Costelloe-Stephen which sections 5 and 6 will 
examine. Despite Bergson’s refusal to debate with Russell, Russell would continue 
responding critically to Bergson in a number of works primarily published during the tens 
and twenties; section 7 will look at Russell’s later responses to Bergson. 
Note that in what follows my primary task is to put together the pieces of the history of 
Russell’s critique of Bergson and, in part, of its contemporary reception. Russell’s many 
misunderstandings of Bergson’s work are only partly addressed by the contemporary 
defences which we shall analyse in what follows. Basic facets of Russell’s interpretation of 
Bergson have all been questioned by subsequent scholarship, such as the claim that he is an 
anti-intellectualist and even an irrationalist, or that he is unwilling to engage in argumentative 
defences of his positions. Focusing in this chapter primarily on presenting Russell’s critique 
in historical context, I defer to further work the task of evaluating the basic misconceptions 
involved in Russell’s interpretation of Bergson. 
 
2. Russell’s encounter with Bergson 
 
While in Paris to present a number of lectures in March 1911, Russell had lunch with 
Bergson.
4
 As preparation for this first meeting, Russell reports buying and hastily reading 
L’Evolution creatrice (see Monk 1997, 202-203). At the time, Bergson had been at the peak 
of his international fame and would soon be visiting England on two occasions.
5
 In May, he 
was awarded an honorary degree by Oxford, and delivered the Huxley Lecture at the 
University of Birmingham. In October, he presented a lecture series on ‘The Nature of the 
Soul’ at UCL.6 In response to Bergson’s UCL lectures, Russell would write that they ‘are 
reported in the daily newspapers – all England has gone mad about him for some reason’ 
(1992, 318).
7
 
On the occasion of assuming the presidency of the Aristotelian Society, Russell was set to 
present the presidential address in November, but following the suggestion of H. Wildon Carr 
                                                             
3
 Later discussions of Russell’s arguments against Bergson include e.g. Čapek (1971) (who 
argues that Russell wilfully misunderstands Bergson in a multitude of manners, and that in 
fact there is a ‘hidden Bergsonism’ (335-345) in Russell’s work); Soulez and Worms (2002); 
Dumoncel (2004); Chase and Reynolds (2011, 23-26). 
4
 As Monk (1997, 200-203) points out, on the night before the Paris lectures Russell began a 
life-changing extramarital affair with Lady Ottoline Morell. Monk (235-236) even detects 
intriguing parallels between Russell’s clash with Morell over their worldviews and his 
criticism of Bergson’s philosophical outlook. 
5
 On the reaction to Bergson’s visits to Britain, see also e.g. Soulez and Worms (2002, 119-
141); de Mille (2008). 
6
 The lectures were published as Bergson (1966). 
7
 Note that Russell’s response to Bergson would prepare the start of his career as a public 
intellectual; see Monk (1997, 233, 247); Russell (1992, 317). 
 3 
 
(who was handing over the presidency to Russell), had to move the date to October so that 
Bergson could attend (see Monk 1997, 232-233). Bergson wrote to Russell to say that he will 
attend the talk, and Russell thought that he should 
 
add some paragraphs for him. His view is that the raw material is a continuous flux to 
which no concepts are exactly applicable. I might suggest that the continuous flux is a 
philosophic construction, not ‘raw’ at all. (1992, 165).8 
 
While he was trying to start reading Bergson’s work for that purpose in early October, 
Russell was invited by C. K. Ogden to present a paper on Bergson to ‘The Heretics’, a 
learned society at Cambridge which functioned as a forum for public intellectuals in a broad 
range of fields within the arts and sciences (see Russell 1992, 313-314). On October 28, 
Russell met Bergson at a dinner hosted by Carr (see Russell 1992, 318; Monk 1997, 238),
9
 
while on October 30 Bergson attended his presidential address, titled ‘On the Relations of 
Universals and Particulars’ (see Monk, 238).10 Russell’s talk did not include the planned 
response to Bergson’s view of the flux.11 Though the minutes do not record Bergson’s 
questions, Russell would report that 
 
Bergson, who was present when I read my paper, obviously thought it antiquated 
nonsense. He said it reminded him of the Greeks, and that in the modern world particulars 
might be taken for granted but universals could only be accepted after careful proof. 
(quoted in Monk 1997, 238)
12
 
 
In a later interview, Bergson attributed Russell’s subsequent criticisms of his work to the fact 
that 
 
‘Russell […] has never forgiven me for the refutation I made one day, orally, of his 
completely materialistic presentation of Platonic forms’. (Quoted in Russell 1992, 319).  
 
Bergson’s intuition seems mistaken, given that we can find the first formulations of 
Russell’s subsequent objections to Bergson in letters written to Lady Ottoline Morell and 
Lucy Donnelly prior to October 30.
13
 For example, Russell (1992) talks of reading Bergson 
as something which interests him in the same way as theology and heraldry do, namely ‘from 
                                                             
8
 Note that this disagreement is later shown by Costelloe-Stephen to be at the heart of 
Russell’s divergence from Bergson (Costelloe 1915). 
9
 Russell (1956, 78) later satirises an incident from that night involving a speech by Shaw in 
defence of Bergson, which Bergson disapproved of. 
10
 It is unclear whether Russell and Bergson met again after this occasion. Though in 1920 it 
was planned that both would present papers at an international philosophical congress in 
Oxford, Russell was unable to attend (see Noël 1920). 
11
 Monk (1997, 236-237) attributes this to Ogden’s invitation, which meant Russell had the 
opportunity to present a full-fledged critique of Bergson. 
12
 Repeating a similar charge against him, Russell (1928a, 65) would later claim that 
Bergson’s philosophy added nothing to Plotinus’ mysticism. 
13
 By extension, Čapek’s (1971) claim that Russell’s critique was a result of his ‘positive, 
almost personal dislike’ (335) and ‘personal animosity’ (335) towards Bergson appears to be 
exaggerated. I should note that I also, in a previous work (Vrahimis 2011), not having noticed 
the dating of these letters, assumed that Bergson’s contention was correct;  I now see that this 
was a mistake. 
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the queerness and fantasticality of the stuff’ (314).14 More than once, his exacerbated 
comments on Bergson are punctuated with the expression ‘Ugh!’ (313, 315). He talks of 
Bergson’s vitalism and anti-intellectualism as ‘the antithesis to me’ (314). About what 
Russell sees as Bergson’s doctrine that activity rather than intellect is what reveals the truth, 
Russell (314) ironically comments that he agrees with him that, once one takes pause to 
think, Bergson’s philosophy ceases to appear true. Russell also repeats that he can understand 
why Bergson has such popular appeal, attributing it to his imaginative defence of ‘Life and 
Action and Movement’ (314). Russell claims that: 
 
Bergson’s philosophy, though it shows constructive imagination, seems to me wholly 
devoid of argument and quite gratuitous; he never thinks about fundamentals, but just 
invents pretty fairy tales. (318) 
 
In what is clearly not a very charitable impression of the subsequent target of his criticism, 
Russell adds that Bergson in person appears ‘too set to be able to understand or answer 
objections to his views’ (318). However, following their October meeting, Russell even 
insists on separating his pronounced dislike of Bergson’s work from any feelings directed 
towards his person: ‘I don’t hate Bergson […] when I met him I liked him’ (315). 
Russell talks of reading Bergson as an ordeal which he has to undergo in order to write the 
Heretics paper. He continuously refers to his struggle to read Bergson charitably, saying that 
such charity requires true Christian spirit (314-315), talking of overcoming his ‘instinctive 
hostility’ (315), seeing it as ‘moral discipline’ (315), and comparing his sympathy for 
Bergson with Bergson’s characterisation of wasps’ paralysing other insects in order to lay 
their eggs in them as sympathy (315). He mentions that his goal for the Heretics paper was to 
write a sympathetic outline of Bergson’s philosophy before developing a critique; yet the 
difficulty in writing the first part lies in that ‘all the phrases that occur to me are turning him 
into ridicule’ (315). Russell also talks of his effort to be charitable in terms of an attempt to 
‘have some imaginative realization’ (315) of Bergson’s outlook, and prior to writing his 
paper claims that ‘I do now really feel his philosophy’ (315). 
Russell’s struggle to read Bergson would first result in a short review (Russell 1992, 385-
386) of his book on Laughter, an Essay on the Meaning of the Comic for the January 1912 
issue of The Cambridge Review (to which I will return). The Heretics paper would follow on 
11 March 1912. The next day, Russell writes that the paper 
 
had a great success last night – the place was packed and they seemed to enjoy it… Not a 
soul rose to defend Bergson at the end, so there was no discussion. McTaggart spoke a few 
graceful words and we all went away. (Russell 1992, 316). 
 
In July, Russell’s (1912a) paper would be published in The Monist and soon reprinted as The 
Philosophy of Bergson (1912b). A reply to Russell was published by H. Wildon Carr (1913) 
in The Cambridge Magazine, and Russell (1913) responded to it. Russell’s paper, along with 
Carr’s reply and the response, were republished along with Russell’s original article in the 
expanded version of The Philosophy of Bergson (Russell 1914a). In its first page, the book 
mentions that The Cambridge Magazine, which had originally published the Russell-Carr 
debate, had requested a response by Bergson, which he avoided, simply noting that: 
 
                                                             
14
 As Slater and Frohmann note, Russell was indeed fascinated by theology and heraldry, 
‘because they are ridiculous’ (Russell 1992, 314). 
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I think excellent the reply that Mr. Wildon Carr has already produced, and which deals 
with the specific points of criticism by Mr. Russell. (Russell 1914a, i). 
 
In this way, Bergson would absolve himself of his responsibility to enter into dialogue with 
Russell. His gesture might have been intended as a way of downplaying the significance of 
Russell’s charges. Instead of having such an effect, Bergson’s silence allowed Russell to have 
the last word on the matter. 
A lesser known voice that entered the debate was that of Karin Costelloe-Stephen, 
Russell’s niece and philosophical protégé.15 Costelloe-Stephen’s 1914 reply to Russell, 
published in The Monist (Costelloe 1914) was received in France as ‘more precise and 
penetrating’ (Anonymous 1914, 19) than Carr’s defence of Bergson. Despite this, it did not 
receive a published written response by Russell.
16
 
Russell would later come to privately admit that his first paper on Bergson ‘was unduly 
flippant, & I am now mildly ashamed of some of the jokes’ (Russell 1992, 318).17 He would, 
nonetheless, as I will go on to show, continue responding to Bergson in a number of 
subsequent works, especially during the tens and twenties (while Bergson’s star was still on 
the rise). 
 
3. The Professor’s Guide to Laughter 
 
Russell’s review of Bergson’s Laughter, published in January 1912, is ironically titled ‘The 
Professor’s Guide to Laughter’ (Russell 1992, 385-386). It takes a mocking tone, ridiculing 
Bergson’s book by humorously, while completely uncharitably, construing it as a kind of 
instruction manual for ‘those to whom laughter has hitherto been an unintelligible vagary, in 
which one must join, though one can never tell when it would break out’ (385). Aside from 
this type of ridicule, Russell’s brief review also contains a number of arguments against what 
he takes Bergson’s project to be, namely the derivation of a formula that is applicable to any 
and all cases of laughter. Russell’s review subjects Bergson’s formula to scrutiny, aiming to 
show that though it may cover some examples of laughter, it does not cover all such 
instances.  
Russell finds what he calls a formula in Bergson’s thesis that ‘the attitudes, gestures and 
movements of the human body’ (quoted in Russell 1992, 385) give rise to laughter insofar as 
they present living things as resembling machines.
18
 Russell interrogates this thesis by 
attempting to show that it and its correlates are neither sufficient nor necessary for laughter. 
Thus, Russell argues, though Bergson’s formula might apply to the familiar slapstick 
example of slipping on an orange peel, it would not apply in the case of serious injury. 
Russell juxtaposes Bergson’s slapstick example with that of a man falling from scaffolding 
and breaking his neck. Bergson’s formula, Russell claims, entails that this should be even 
                                                             
15
 It should be noted that Karin Costelloe was in the meanwhile married, and changed her 
name to Stephen; thus while her responses to Russell are signed Costelloe (1914, 1915), her 
later book on Bergson is signed Stephen (1922). For an extended analysis of her response to 
Russell’s critique of Bergson, see Vrahimis (2019b). 
16
 Russell’s correspondence indicates he knew of the reply (Forte 1988, 207). Russell did 
later engage in debate with Costelloe-Stephen on Bergson; see Vrahimis (2019b). 
17
 In the letter, Russell contrasts his ‘flippant’ attitude towards Bergson with Santayana’s 
critical manner towards himself, noting the fairness of Santayana’s criticisms. 
18
 Russell (1928b) elsewhere notes that ‘Bergson’s philosophy was a protest—not, to my 
mind, wholly sound from an intellectual point of view, but inspired by a wholesome dread of 
seeing men turned more and more into machines’ (85). 
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funnier than slipping on an orange peel, ‘since the movement is even more completely 
mechanical’ (385). 
Russell also offers counterexamples to Bergson’s contention that repetition, which is a 
kind of mechanical behaviour, always gives rise to laughter; this is not necessarily so e.g. 
when a bad joke is repeated. Russel further conjures counterexamples to Bergson’s 
contention that types, rather than individuals, are objects of laughter. This is not a necessary 
condition given that some types (e.g. Balzac’s characters) are tragic rather than comic; it is 
not a sufficient condition given that some individuals (e.g. Falstaff) are comic, rather than 
tragic. Russell argues that Bergson’s formula fails to account for cases in which the precise 
opposite of what it describes, i.e. the humanisation of mechanical processes, leads to laughter. 
Bergson’s formula, Russell suggests, cannot accommodate the element of surprise in humour. 
Bergson’s contention that humour is the product of pure intelligence and not sentiment is 
countered by appeal to Hamlet’s character. According to Russell, ‘Hamlet’s wit is full of 
passion; in quiet times he would have made less jokes’ (1992, 386). 
Russell thus concludes that it is impossible to discover a single formula which could fulfil 
such a role, and that humour is an irreducibly multifaceted phenomenon. Though Russell has, 
as we have seen above, shown Bergson’s particular formula to be problematic (if taken as 
necessary and sufficient for laughter), Russell offers little by way of argument in backing his 
claim about the impossibility of producing such a formula. He briefly opposes ‘Latin’ to 
‘Teutonic’, as well as ‘French’ to ‘British’ humour, but this is obviously not enough to make 
a serious case against a comprehensive account of humour. 
Finally, Russell attempts to turn Bergson’s formula against itself. According to the 
formula, treating living things as mechanisms is what gives rise to laughter. Formulas, as 
Russell (1992, 386) points out, do exactly that: they show a living thing to function in a 
mechanical manner. In other words, Bergson’s contention is not only that we laugh at things 
that resemble mechanisms, but also that laughter itself is a kind of mechanism that is 
triggered by such a category of phenomena. Russell’s review closes by pointing out that the 
latter implies that Bergson’s formula ‘is therefore by his own rule itself a fitting object of 
laughter’ (1992, 386).19 
Russell is taken to task for this assertion in the context of a critique of his theory of types 
put forth by Paul Weiss (1928).
20
 Weiss argues that Russell’s attempt to apply the formula to 
itself constitutes a violation of the theory of types: 
 
The characterisation of all formulae, even though it refers to a totality, seems to Mr. 
Russell to be of the same type as the formula characterised. (1928, 338). 
 
In other words, according to Weiss, this part of Russell’s criticism of Bergson is not 
admissible by Russell’s own standards, as developed elsewhere. Perhaps, then, we should 
take Russell’s application of the formula to itself as primarily intended for comic effect, 
rather than as a serious counterargument against Bergson. 
 
                                                             
19
 Note that Russell’s later works (e.g. Russell 1988, 19, 70-71) continue to mock Bergson’s 
view of laughter. 
20
 A predecessor for Weiss’ criticism could be found in Jourdain’s (1918) whimsical The 
philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*l, which pretends to offer a hierarchical theory of types for 
jokes (81-82) in which a specific type is only appreciated by ‘the frequenters of music-halls, 
Conservatives, and M. Bergson’. Furthermore, in lieu of a published version of his views of 
laughter by the fictional ‘B*rtr*nd R*ss*l’, Jourdain (1918, 86-87) quotes verbatim Russell’s 
review of Bergson. 
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4. Russell’s 1912 critique of Bergson 
 
In ‘The Philosophy of Bergson’ (1912a), Russell’s main line of argument runs counter to 
what he construes as Bergson’s anti-intellectualism. This thesis is summarised by Russell as 
the position that ‘intellect is the misfortune of man, while instinct is seen at its best in ants, 
bees, and Bergson’ (Russell 1912a, 323). Russell (1912a) sees Bergson’s anti-intellectualism 
as ultimately relying on his conceptions of space and time, and claims that: 
 
If they are true, such minor errors and inconsistencies as no philosopher escapes would not 
greatly matter, while if they are false, nothing remains [of Bergson’s philosophy] except 
an imaginative epic, to be judged on esthetic rather than on intellectual grounds. (334) 
 
Unsurprisingly, as we shall see, Russell’s consideration of Bergson’s conception of space and 
time does in fact lead to what Russell considers to be insurmountable objections. Russell thus 
concludes that only ‘esthetic’ grounds remain as criteria for accepting or rejecting 
Bergsonism. 
Russell contents that Bergson’s conception of space relies on a particular technical error 
concerning the nature of number. Russell clarifies that the word ‘number’ may mean three 
distinct things, and confusion between them has led philosophers astray. ‘Number’ may mean 
either: 
 
(1) the general concept of number, 
 
(2) some particular number (e.g. the number 12), or 
 
(3) some particular collection to which a number is applied (e.g. the 12 apostles). 
 
As Russell points out, Bergson confusedly defines ‘number’ as a collection of units (i.e. 
identifies ‘number’ with one of its three meanings, namely (3) above). The confusion lies in 
the fact that there are two more distinct senses of ‘number’ which this definition excludes, 
namely: ‘number’ qua ‘general concept applicable to the various particular numbers’ (Russell 
1912a, 335) – i.e. (1) above – and ‘number’ qua particular numbers – i.e. (2) above). As 
Russell points out, Bergson relies on this confusion in order to claim that number is primarily 
spatial, a conclusion which can only be reached about ‘number’ in the sense employed by 
Bergson – i.e. (3) – and not in the other two senses of ‘number’ – i.e. (1) and (2). Whereas 
‘number’ in the former sense can be pictured in space, this does not apply to the latter two 
senses.  
Russell indirectly connects the error made by Bergson to his own conception of the 
rebellion against idealism, implicitly suggesting that Bergson’s version of the rebellion has 
not been adequately disentangled from its idealist inheritance.
21
 Bergson’s confused 
definition of number relies on ignorance of modern developments in mathematics, which 
Russell sees as wilful. Bergson relies instead on an antiquated view of mathematics favoured 
by 
 
Hegel and his followers [who] seized upon these fallacies and confusions to support them 
in their attempt to prove all mathematics self-contradictory. Thence the Hegelian account 
of these matters passed into the current thought of philosophers, where it has remained 
                                                             
21
 This was the subject of various contemporary debates of Bergson; see e.g. James (1910); 
Bosanquet (1910, 10-11). 
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long after the mathematicians have removed all the difficulties upon which the 
philosophers rely. And so long as the main object of philosophers is to show that nothing 
can be learned by patience and detailed thinking, but that we ought rather to worship the 
prejudices of the ignorant under the title of "reason" if we are Hegelians, or of "intuition" 
if we are Bergsonians, so long philosophers will take care to remain ignorant of what 
mathematicians have done to remove the errors by which Hegel profited. (Russell 1912a, 
338). 
 
Russell here is clear about what his preferred approach is, namely an anti-idealistic (and 
particularly anti-Hegelian) philosophy that allies itself with the advances of modern science 
and logic. Bergson is thus implicitly criticised for not taking anti-idealism far enough, 
precisely due to his sceptical position with regard to scientific and logico-mathematical 
expertise.
22
  
Based on his critique of Bergson’s misconception of number, Russell further objects to 
Bergson’s conception of the relation between space and time. Bergson’s claim that every 
plurality of distinct units involves space, as Russell points out, is arbitrarily founded only on 
vision; we may count a plurality of distinct steps that we hear a passer-by take, though 
(contrary to Bergson’s claim) this does not require visually imagining them in a space. 
Furthermore, this conception of space is assumed in Bergson’s differentiation between 
spatialized ‘time’, which can involve a plurality of distinct quantities, and pure duration, 
which is purely qualitative (and not quantifiable). Thus, Russell argues, Bergson’s view of 
the priority of geometry over arithmetic or logic (on which his anti-intellectualism relies) is 
shown to result from the combination of his prior fundamental mistake about mathematics 
with his preference for visualisation. 
According to Russell, a further elementary confusion underlies Bergson’s conception of 
time. Russell (1912a) claims that Bergson does not differentiate ‘between the present 
occurrence of a recollection and the past occurrence which is recollected’ (342). According to 
Russell, this confusion implies that what Bergson presents as a theory of time turns out not to 
be about time at all. What Bergson presents as a discussion of the past and the present is 
simply a discussion of two subjective psychological processes: the present recollection of an 
image of something past, and present perception. The present act of remembering, as Russell 
points out, is clearly not identical with that past occurrence which is remembered.  
Russell attributes this error to ‘the confusion between an act of knowing and that which is 
known’ (343), and ultimately to a failure to adequately differentiate between subject and 
object. Russell sees this error as inherited from the idealist tradition, and in objecting to it 
implicitly signals towards Moore’s (1903) and his own (1912c) arguments against this 
idealist confusion.  In confusing the recollection of a past occurrence with the past occurrence 
itself, Bergson blurs the line between the act of knowing and that which is known. Once this 
confusion of subject and object is clarified, Russell thinks, it becomes obvious that what 
posed as a conception of time is merely a conception of memory. 
A similar blurring occurs, according to Russell, in Bergson’s conception of images. 
Russell claims that, according to Bergson, images are what both matter and our perception 
thereof consists of. Russell (1912a, 344) quotes Bergson’s definition of images as being not 
merely what idealists call representations, nor fully what realists call things, but a sort of 
intermediary between the two. Russell notes that, for Bergson, images can exist unperceived 
(as unconscious mental states). Furthermore, in connection with images, ‘the difference 
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 Russell (1912a, 339-341) thinks that, by extension, Bergson is mistaken in applying these 
views to his solution of Zeno’s paradox; see also Carr 1914, 30-31; Russell 1914c, 137-143, 
150-152, 165. 
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between being and being consciously perceived is only one of degree’ (344). Russell clarifies 
that: 
 
The distinction which Bergson has in mind in the above is not, I think, the distinction 
between the imaging as a mental occurrence and the thing imaged as an object. He is 
thinking of the distinction between the thing as it is and the thing as it appears, neither of 
which belongs to the subject. The distinction between subject and object, between the 
mind which thinks and remembers and has images on the one hand, and the objects 
thought about, remembered, or imaged — this distinction, so far as I can see, is wholly 
absent from his philosophy. (345) 
 
In other words, according to Russell, both in the case of memory and in the case of imaging, 
Bergson’s failure to acknowledge the distinction between subject and object leads him to 
various inconsistent positions. For example, Russell points out that for Bergson unperceived 
images are both what matter consists of, and also simultaneously somehow unconscious 
mental entities. Russell also questions whether it is consistent for Bergson to argue that his 
theory of images makes no metaphysical claims, while also implying ‘that every reality has 
“a kinship, an analogy, in short a relation” with consciousness’ (345). 
According to Russell, through the absence of the distinction between subject and object in 
both the case of memory and imaging, Bergson’s theories lead to the strange conclusion that 
whatever I remember or picture is here and now. Russell presents Bergson’s fallacious line of 
thought as follows: 
 
1) Subjective thoughts, whether they are memories or images, exist in me here and now. 
 
2) If objects and subjects are indistinct, then they must have the same spatiotemporal 
location. 
 
3) Therefore, the remembered or imaged object exists in me here and now. 
 
The above mistaken conclusion, Russell claims, is a consequence of Bergson’s failure to 
distinguish between subject and object in his conception of memory and of images. Once the 
distinction between subject and object is correctly conceived, the fallacious conclusion can be 
avoided. 
With this, we return to Russell’s initial claim, namely that without a reliable conception of 
time and space, Bergson’s anti-intellectualism seems unfounded. Or at least, as Russell points 
out, it may seem to lack any argumentative grounding. However, Russell admits that one of 
the difficulties in dealing with what he takes to be an anti-intellectualist like Bergson’s is 
precisely that proof through argument could not play the role we usually expect it to play 
when we are engaged in philosophising. 
 
a large part of Bergson's philosophy, probably the part to which most of its popularity is 
due, does not depend upon argument, and cannot be upset by argument. His imaginative 
picture of the world, regarded as a poetic effort, is in the main not capable of either proof 
or disproof. Shakespeare says life's but a walking shadow, Shelley says it is like a dome of 
many coloured glass, Bergson says it is a shell which bursts into parts that are again shells. 
If you like Bergson's image better, it is just as legitimate. (Russell 1912a, 346).
23
 
                                                             
23
 A variant of this same view, presented in very similar phrasing, is used by Neurath (1973, 
160) against Spengler; see Vrahimis (forthcoming). 
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Thus Russell’s contention is that, given his critique of Bergson’s conceptions of space and 
time, ‘esthetic’ reasons can be the only criterion for choosing whether or not to follow 
Bergsonism. Such reasons, as Russell has pointed out, are not questionable by means of 
intellectualist arguments. Thus, Russell’s final move against Bergson is to relegate his claims 
to the domain of poetry, rather than of philosophy (see also Vrahimis 2019a). 
 
5. Carr’s reply and Russell’s response 
 
The officially sanctioned Bergsonian response, as noted above, was authored by H. Wildon 
Carr, who had recently published his Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change in 1911. In 
what follows, I will look at Carr’s reply alongside Russell’s response to it. 
Carr’s defence of Bergson divides Russell’s criticisms into two main parts, namely the 
theory of space and the theory of time. Bergson’s anti-intellectualism, Carr agrees with 
Russell, relies on these two theories, which he seeks to defend against the Russellian 
offensive. Undertaking the defence entails restoring Bergson as a metaphysician, and Carr 
clarifies that Bergson’s poetry does not appeal to him (1914, 32). 
Carr opens his reply by rejecting Russell’s characterisation of Bergson as a visualiser. Carr 
thinks this is a psychological hypothesis which each can examine for themselves through the 
means of introspection. Carr thus claims to have resolved this question by quasi-experimental 
means: he asked Bergson whether he is a visualiser, which Bergson denied (1914, 28). In his 
reply to Carr, Russell happily accepts the information that Bergson is not a visualiser, 
acknowledging his mistake concerning Bergson’s psychology. He nonetheless insists on the 
occularcentrism characteristic of Bergson’s philosophy, which he continues to think does 
indeed prioritise vision. 
Carr suggests that Russell’s mistake arises from his misunderstanding of the peculiar use 
to which Bergson puts the concept of ‘image’. According to Carr, Bergson 
 
uses the word image for what Mr. Russell calls a sense datum and other philosophers a 
presentation; and perhaps the greatest disadvantage of Bergson's term is that it suggests 
something exclusively visual. (1914, 28). 
 
In other words, Carr thinks that Russell’s confusion can be cleared away once it is 
acknowledged that Bergsonian ‘images’ are not visual perceptions. 
The accusation of being a visualiser is tied to Russell’s criticisms of Bergson’s conception 
of number. In defence of Bergson, Carr suggests that there may be an ‘order of knowing’ 
(1914, 28) involved in the three senses of number outlined by Russell. Carr questions whether 
Russell intends to say that one can be acquainted with a universal number (e.g. the number 
12) without having been acquainted with particular collections to which a number is applied 
(e.g. 12 apostles or a dozen eggs). Carr sees Russell as conceding Bergson’s view that 
conceiving of a number ‘implies a visual image in space’ (Carr 1914, 28), but only in the 
sense of number as a particular collection to which a number is applied. Carr then proceeds to 
argue that, if the order of knowledge moves from particular collections to universal numbers 
to the concept of number in general, then all subsequent levels rely on the spatial image 
involved in acquaintance with particular collections. 
In reply, Russell clarifies that his critique did not concede Bergson’s point concerning 
collections, as Carr assumes. In response to Carr’s hierarchy for the three senses of number, 
Russell protests that this question is ‘logically irrelevant’ (Russell 1914b, 34). Russell 
nonetheless clarifies that he is not committed to the view that we need to be acquainted with a 
particular dozen in order to be acquainted with the universal number 12, as would be clarified 
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in the example of being acquainted with the number 34,361without ever being acquainted 
with ‘a collection of 34,361 units’ (34). 
Carr’s reply also addresses the second prong of Russell’s attack, i.e. the critique of 
Bergson’s theory of duration. Russell, Carr points out, mentions Bergson’s picture of the 
universe that ‘changes from nothing to nothing’ (Carr 1914, 31). Here Carr suggests that 
Russell has misunderstood Bergson’s idiosyncratic use of the word ‘nothing’ to stand for a 
‘pseudo-idea’ (31). Russell acknowledges that Bergson sees ‘nothing’ as a pseudo-idea, and 
that he agrees with this view ‘though for different reasons’ (Russell 1914b, 35) than 
Bergson’s. He clarifies that in the passage Carr quoted he did not intend to use the word 
‘nothing’ in this technical sense, but rather ‘as it ordinarily would be used, as an abbreviation 
for the phrase “not from anything and not to anything”’ (Russell 1914b, 35). 
More central to Russell’s critique is Carr’s hesitation concerning Russell’s depiction of 
Bergson as obliterating the distinction between subject and object. Carr here points to a 
demarcation between two types of account Bergson offers: his epistemological account of 
intellectual acts of knowing, and his theory of intuition. In Carr’s view, the Bergsonian 
epistemology of intellect clearly acknowledges the distinction between subject and object. 
Bergson’s anti-intellectualism in fact relies on this account of the separation of subject and 
object in the ordinary intellectual relation between the two. As Carr points out, it is only in 
those rare instances of intuitive grasp that the ordinary separation breaks down and the 
subject enters into the object. In intuition, which only very rarely occurs, the act of knowing 
and the thing known become identical, because intuition is an act of knowing that ‘itself 
knows its knowing’ (Carr 1914, 32). In other words, the act of knowing and the thing known 
are one and the same in intuition. Carr argues that Bergson’s account of the fusion of subject 
and object in this rare reflexive case of intuitive knowledge cannot be the result of confusion 
– it is, instead, essential to the doctrine. Carr thus concludes that a critic like Russell could, 
instead of calling it confused, justifiably doubt whether this type of knowledge is possible. 
Russell agrees with Carr that the blurring of subject and object is essential to Bergson’s 
thesis, but insists that this does not mean it is not a confused blurring. Russell claims that 
anyone who understands the subject-object distinction will see that it cannot find exceptions, 
even in Bergson’s conception of intuition: 
 
In the case of memory, this seems particularly evident, since it becomes necessary for 
Bergson to identify remembering with what is remembered, and therefore to say that 
whatever is remembered still endures. To say that such identification is of the essence of 
his doctrine is no defence; the only valid defence would be to show that remembering is in 
fact identical with what is remembered. (Russell 1914b, 35). 
 
Russell had opened his response to Carr by noting that his paper did not, as Carr suggests, 
attempt to show Bergson’s philosophy to be false. Russell acknowledges that even if the two 
main lines of argument in favour of Bergson’s philosophical conclusions, i.e. the theories of 
space and time, are shown to be fallacious, this does not falsify those conclusions. Showing 
the arguments supporting them to be fallacious simply renders such conclusions ‘mere 
imaginative possibilities to be placed alongside of the thousand other possibilities invented by 
cosmic poets’ (Russell 1914b, 33). Russell closes his response to Carr by repeating the 
conclusion of his paper, acknowledging the futility of attempting to refute an anti-
intellectualist like Bergson: 
 
if the intellect is in fact misleading, as Bergson contends, it is useless to employ it against 
him. It is true that Bergson continually employs it in his own defence, by advancing 
arguments which plainly are intended to be intellectually satisfying. But this perhaps is a 
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concession to the unconverted: when his philosophy has triumphed, it is to be supposed 
that argument will cease, and intellect will be lulled to sleep on the heaving sea of 
intuition. But until that consummation the protests of intellect will continue. (36) 
 
6. Costelloe-Stephen’s reply 
 
Costelloe-Stephen’s reply to Russell overlaps with Carr’s on various points, which, for the 
sake of brevity, I will not address here.
24
 Instead I will focus on one point of criticism 
original to Costelloe-Stephen, which is the charge that Russell’s objections are based on a 
misunderstanding of Bergson’s conception of the process of change. This central 
misunderstanding is derived from Russell’s failure to correctly differentiate between what 
Costelloe-Stephen calls the mathematical description of change and real change qua process. 
According to the former, change is nothing but a series of different discreet static states. 
Bergson’s conception of change, by contrast, relies on the assumption that the mathematical 
description cannot but leave out that which is essential to change, namely the fact that it is a 
process. Change qua process is a dynamic flux, not reducible to a series of static elements. 
Bergson’s anti-intellectualism derives from his view that the intellect is unable to conceive 
of change as anything other than a series of discreet states, thus always leaving out change 
qua process. The intellect cannot grasp change while in process, but only as change 
completed, i.e. a phenomenon which can be analysed according to the mathematical 
description. If the intellect cannot live up to the task, then some other explanation is required 
for how anyone might come to be acquainted with such a thing as a process of change. As 
Russell does recognise, Bergson’s epistemology leaves the task up to intuition. Yet, 
Costelloe-Stephen points out, we need to qualify what Bergson means by intuition in order 
not to misunderstand him as Russell does. 
In Costelloe-Stephen’s view, Bergson’s conception of intuition is really that of a special 
type of introspection. Intellectual introspection can, of course, acquaint us with sense data 
qua elements of perception already broken down by intellect into discreet units (what 
Costelloe-Stephen elsewhere calls complexes of sense data (Costelloe 1915)). Bergson does 
not deny the possibility of intellectual introspection, but, according to Costelloe-Stephen, 
develops another type of intuitive introspection. This conception of intuitive introspection 
concerns our immediate acquaintance with a flux that is yet to be differentiated. A particular 
example of this is found in Bergson’s account of duration. According to Bergson, we learn 
through introspection that in memory the past mingles with the present, in the sense of being 
in a continuous process of change. Costelloe-Stephen’s point, following Bergson, is that upon 
introspection what we find is not a separation of past and present into ‘a series of distinct 
units joined by relations’ (Costelloe 1914, 151), but a blurring of the two where it is never 
clear where precisely to draw the line which distinguishes them. This is what is meant by 
Bergson’s use of ‘duration’. 
Russell’s objection against a confusion of the remembered past with the real past is thus 
irrelevant to Bergson, Costelloe-Stephen argues. Bergson is only concerned with our 
introspective awareness of past and present, and is at pains to argue that these are in a 
continuous process of change. Costelloe-Stephen claims that in order to object to Bergson, 
Russell would have to show that, upon introspection, we do not find such a process of change 
in the sense described by Bergson (Costelloe 1914, 151); this is simply not addressed by 
Russell’s critique.25 Russell is right, Costelloe-Stephen shows, to accuse Bergson of a 
                                                             
24
 For an extended account of Costelloe’s response, see Vrahimis (2019b). 
25
 This is, as we saw above, roughly what Russell had originally intended to address in his 
Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society. 
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confused conception of the past as it occurred – but his mistake is of little consequence to 
Bergson’s conception of duration (Costelloe 1914, 152). 
 
7. Russell rereads Bergson 
 
Russell’s encounter with Bergson’s work is not limited to the 1912a article and his debate 
with Carr (Russell 1914a). Russell’s work throughout the 1910s and 1920s will keep 
returning to Bergson as an interlocutor. Russell’s stance towards Bergson varies depending 
on the issue at hand, and ranges from qualified agreement (e.g. Russell 1914, 230; 1988, 5) 
to, as we shall see, some very aggressive polemics. In what follows I will divide his 
responses into three types. The first deals with the political consequences of Bergsonism, in 
which case Russell seems to be at his most polemical. The second deals with the positioning, 
both historical and systematic, of Bergsonism among other philosophical trends. The third 
concerns particular systematic positions upheld by Bergson, which Russell treats primarily 
critically. 
 
7.1. The political manifestations of Bergsonism 
 
Russell’s polemics against Bergsonism is epitomised in his review of Luce’s Bergson’s 
Doctrine of Intuition (Russell 1988, 413-415). Here, Luce’s Bergsonist anti-intellectualism is 
depicted by Russell as ‘nothing but an invitation to abandon self-control in certain cases in 
which it is painful’ (1988, 414). Russell claims that Luce’s version of Bergsonian intuition is 
manifested in the Futurists’ stance towards art, and ‘in politics as the belief in violence’ 
(414). Instead of contesting Luce’s reading of Bergson, Russell in fact is content to agree 
with it. He thereby concludes that its brand of anti-intellectualism can be used to excuse 
various failures to employ the intellect, with disastrous consequences. Russell bleakly agrees 
with Luce that Bergson’s philosophy is in harmony with ‘the spirit of the Western world 
today’ (415), and that the proper response to this is to ‘note the fact and seek elsewhere for 
something less tainted’ (415). 
Scott (1919) had developed the view that what he perceived as a philosophical realism in 
both Russell and Bergson had provided a theoretical foundation for Syndicalism. In response, 
Russell (1988, 326-328) rejected the view that Bergson is a realist, and questioned his 
connection to Sorel’s Syndicalism, noting that the only Sorelian who connected Syndicalism 
to Bergsonism was T. E. Hulme. And though Russell himself was indeed both a realist and 
favourable to Syndicalism, he notes (referring to himself in the third person) that ‘there is, in 
fact, no logical connection between his philosophy and his politics’ (Russell 1988, 328). 
Russell thus wholly rejects this attempt to connect his philosophical and political views to 
Bergson’s. 
In Power, Russell (1938, 268-269) portrays Bergson’s politics as a kind of metaphysical 
‘power-philosophy’. Despite, as we have seen, having been criticised for this by both Carr 
and Costelloe-Stephen, Russell repeats earlier claims concerning Bergson’s aversion against 
the intellect in favour of instinctual intuition. Russell concludes that from Bergson’s views, 
‘it follows that men should be passionate and irrational; fortunately for Bergson’s happiness, 
they usually are’ (269). Russell (1938) groups the work of Bergson together with the 
pragmatists and Nietzsche as ‘power-philosophies’, a view which finds its most famous 
expression in his History of Western Philosophy. 
Here, in 1946, Russell briefly returns to the theme of Bergsonist politics in what is 
essentially a republication of his 1912a Monist paper with slight modifications. The 
modifications consist primarily of the addition of a prequel discussing Bergson’s political 
affiliations. Russell mentions that Bergson had some influence on Sorel’s syndicalism. He 
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claims that nonetheless ‘the main effect of Bergson’s philosophy was conservative, and it 
harmonized easily with the movement which culminated in Vichy’ (Russell 1946, 819) 
(without mention of Bergson’s refusal to accept an exemption from the Vichy regime’s anti-
Semitic laws). Russell also notes that Bergson’s philosophy did influence other currents that 
were not politically aligned to conservatism or Vichy. In the bigger picture of Russell’s 
(1946) taxonomy of contemporary philosophy, Bergson (like Nietzsche and others (819)) 
falls into a line of influence stemming from an irrationalism which ‘is a natural sequel to 
Hume’s destruction of empiricism’ (699), and which Russell sees as having dire political 
consequences. 
 
7.2. Bergson’s place in twentieth century philosophy 
 
Russell seems to have held a view of French philosophy as having been in decline since early 
modern times. In private, he expresses this in correspondence with Lucy Donelly from April 
1913, where he writes: 
 
since Descartes, or at any rate since Malebranche, there has been no competent 
philosopher in France. I know most of the present lot personally, & tho, I have received 
much kindness from them, I don't know one who seems to me any good, not excluding 
Bergson. […] On the Continent, I am inclined to think Austria the best country for 
philosophy at present--Germany was ruined by Bismark [sic].’ (Forte 1988, 204) 
 
Russell (1988, 435-437) expressed similar views in public writings, such as his 1922 review 
of Gunn’s Modern French Philosophy which places Bergson’s philosophy within a bigger 
picture of the decline of French philosophy since the 18
th
 century. Russell’s 
overgeneralisations on this matter include such caricatures as that ‘French philosophers tend 
to be what James called ‘‘tender-minded”, and what a less kindly person would call “soft”’ 
(1988, 435).
26
 Russell contentiously depicts French philosophy as falling prey to a 
‘combination of sentimentalism and party spirit […] ever since the days of Madame de 
Maintenon, to whom, no doubt, it is largely due’ (435). What he calls sentimentalism is 
attributed to Jesuit education, which, he seems to indirectly suggest, lay the foundations for 
subsequent anti-intellectualist views. The Jesuits, according to Russell, taught ‘boys to arrive 
at opinions by feeling rather than thought’ (1988, 435). Russell also says that the Jesuits 
‘invented propaganda’ (435) and thus accuses them of politicising the formation of opinions, 
making it a matter of belonging to a group rather than of individual rational choice. Though it 
is of course clear that there is much to criticise in Russell’s oversimplified misconception of 
the history of French philosophy, it helps to clarify the bigger picture in Russell’s mind in his 
opposition against Bergson. For example, it may explain a certain picture of the history of 
philosophy that Russell might have in mind in accusing Bergson for offering no arguments 
for his views. 
Russell may not have responded to Costelloe-Stephen’s reply to his critique, but he did 
review her analysis of Bergson in The Misuse of Mind (Stephen 1922). The review, titled 
‘Analytic and Synthetic Philosophers’ (Russell 1988, 406-410) not only inaugurates the use 
of the term ‘analytic philosophy’ in its title, but also announces an early rendition of what has 
subsequently been called the analytic-continental divide (see Vrahimis (2019b)). Russell 
contrasts Moore as what he calls an ‘analytic’ philosopher to Costelloe-Stephen’s work as 
philosophy of ‘the synthetic type, which has been almost exclusively dominant on the 
Continent’ (Russell 1988, 406). Russell here takes Costelloe-Stephen, along with Bergson, to 
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 In Russell (1914b, 13), Bergson is identified as ‘tender-minded’. 
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task for having ‘no belief in argument’ (407), and for a preference for mysticism over 
scientific knowledge. Whereas Moore’s type of philosophy can ‘seem humdrum and 
pedestrian’ (407), Bergsonism allows for grand narratives and thus ‘appeals to “idealists”, i.e. 
to people who wish to think mankind greater and grander than they are’ (410). Interestingly, 
Russell here corrects his earlier mistake (pointed out by both Carr and Costelloe-Stephen’s 
replies; see also Stebbing (1914)) of identifying Bergson with a kind of pragmatist appeal to 
action. Instead, Russell clarifies (1988, 409-410) that pragmatism and Bergson point to 
opposed directions on this matter. Strangely enough, though he admits this error, he goes on 
to repeat it in subsequent references to Bergson (e.g. he does not retract the claim in the 1946 
reprint of his 1912a article (Russell 1946, 820)). 
As highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, Russell’s ‘Philosophy in the Twentieth 
Century’ (1928a) presents his own approach and that of Bergson as two sides of a general 
revolt against idealism. We have seen, in Russell’s critique, that he paints Bergson’s revolt 
against idealism as incomplete by comparison with his own. Russell suggests that Bergson 
unwittingly reverts to the old idealist modes of philosophising, e.g. in his account of 
perception, or in his understanding of mathematics which Russell sees as relying on outdated 
Hegelian ‘muddles’ (1946, 857). 
A complementary map of his contemporary philosophy, focusing however on systematic 
rather than historical issues, is given in Our knowledge of the external world. The book opens 
with a division of its contemporary metaphilosophical scene into three parts: (i) the 
traditional idealist view of philosophy, (ii) what Russell calls the ‘evolutionist’ (1914c, 4) 
view, and (iii) his own ‘logical atomist’ position. He classifies Bergson’s intuitionism as a 
type of evolutionism, which Russell attempts to debunk. Repeating the familiar claim 
outlined above, Russell notes the performative contradiction involved in Bergson’s 
development of anti-intellectualism as an intellectual position (1914, 18-25). His attempt to 
illustrate the fallibility of intuition attacks a strawman of Bergson’s conception of intuition as 
reducible to instinct. Russell can thus easily show instinct to lead to deception, such as in 
cases of self-knowledge’s blindness to vices, or love causing people to falsely ‘think they see 
into another soul as into their own’ (Russell 1914c, 24). These are clearly not the examples of 
purportedly indubitable introspective awareness that, as we have seen, Carr and Costelloe-
Stephen show Bergson to have in mind when speaking of intuition. The misunderstanding 
here becomes clear when Russell goes on to talk of direct acquaintance as requiring no 
additional ‘special faculty of intuition’ (1914c, 25). If what Bergson means by intuition is 
what Russell means by direct acquaintance (see e.g. Costelloe 1915), then they are talking at 
cross purposes. 
 
7.3. Systematic objections 
 
Having opened by demarcating Russell’s own ‘logical atomist’ position from that of the 
‘evolutionists’, Our knowledge of the external world goes on to discuss a number of other 
systematic views defended by Bergson. Throughout the book, Russell repeats various 
criticisms of Bergson’s view of continuity in motion (similar to those developed in The 
Monist article). Russell also discusses Bergson’s brand of scepticism about causation (229-
233).
27
 
According to Russell, causation requires that the same cause will have the same effect. In 
Russell’s account, Bergson denies this possibility for mental events, since each moment 
grasped by a mind is completely unique (as determined by the different memory involved in 
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each moment).
28
 The example discussed by Russell is that of the repetition of the reading of a 
poem. Bergson would say that each time I hear the poem is different, given that the present 
state of my memory will be different each time. From this, Bergson  
 
infers that every mental event is a genuine novelty, not predictable from the past, because 
the past contains nothing exactly like it by which we could imagine it. (Russell 1914c, 
230). 
 
Though Russell admits that Bergson is right concerning the novelty of mental events, he 
points out that his conclusions concerning causality are not justified by his conception of 
novelty. Russell argues that we need only talk of kinds (instead of specific detailed 
descriptions of mental events) in order to bring back causality. If a certain kind of cause can 
bring about a certain kind of effect, it does not matter whether that kind was part of one 
specific mental event rather than another. Thus, Russell argues, once the principle of 
causation is stated in terms of kinds, the problem Bergson raises is overcome. Furthermore, 
Bergson’s objection relies on the assumption that a cause is a single event, rather than a series 
of discreet events or a continuum. According to Russell, Bergson’s argument is based on a 
discussion of a limited choice of cases concerning the determination of mental events by 
single past causes, and is therefore inconclusive. 
Russell’s 1946 reworking of his systematic objections to Bergson in the History of 
Western Philosophy faces a difficulty not encountered by the original in 1912a, namely the 
fact that Russell had in the meanwhile changed his mind about one of his two basic criticisms 
of Bergson. Russell does seem to hold on to his argument concerning the analysis of 
‘number’, which is in fact repeated in subsequent sections (Russell 1946, 858). Nonetheless, 
Russell changed his mind concerning the subject-object distinction, on which his most basic 
criticisms of Bergson rely.
29
 One only needs to turn to the next chapter of the book to find 
Russell’s verdict on William James’ critique of the distinction between subject and object. 
Russell confesses to having become convinced by William James and his followers not only 
that he is right in this, but that James would ‘on this ground alone, deserve a high place 
among philosophers’ (Russell 1946, 840). Despite this change of heart which contradicts his 
verdict against Bergson, and despite, as we have seen, having had his misinterpretations of 
Bergson corrected by subsequent interlocutors, Russell in 1946 chose to republish his 1912a 
positions on Bergson without substantial revisions. Upon discovering this mistake, Broad 
commented that ‘Jupiter sometimes nods’ (Broad 1947, 263). 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Despite the mistake, Russell’s criticism of Bergson in The History of Western Philosophy 
remains to this day quite well known. By contrast, what I have outlined above is an oft 
forgotten sustained engagement with Bergson’s views throughout Russell’s work. Bergson, 
as we have seen, did not enter into the debate, while Carr’s limited set of objections was 
presented as conclusively dismissed by Russell. A more promising chance for dialogue was 
that opened by Costelloe-Stephen. However, Russell’s later review of Costelloe-Stephen’s 
work refuses the dialogue, pointing instead to a rift between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ 
philosophy that subsequent philosophers came to perceive as an obstacle to dialogue. 
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 Russell (1915, 229-230) again discusses Bergson’s view of novelty. 
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 This inconsistency is first noted in Broad’s (1947, 263) review of Russell; see Wahl (2019, 
52). 
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Russell had ended his 1912a paper on Bergson by arguing that his work should be read as 
poetry rather than philosophy. The claim derives from the most basic problem Russell 
presents anti-intellectualism as facing, namely the requirement that it somehow appeal to the 
intellect which it is meant to undermine. He would repeat similar claims in his later 
commentaries on Bergson. Furthermore, this claim sets up a pattern that was to be repeated in 
various subsequent ‘analytic’ attacks against ‘continental’ philosophy (see Vrahimis 2013). 
As we have seen, this purported anti-intellectualist conundrum did not stop Russell from 
critically responding to a number of philosophical positions developed by Bergson. In other 
words, though Russell’s polemical rhetoric suggests that we should stop reading Bergson as a 
philosopher and simply see his work as literature, Russell does not appear to have followed 
his own advice.
30
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